



“On Reading Newton as An Epicurean: Kant, Spinozism and the Changes to the Principia”​[1]​

In this paper I argue for three distinct, albeit mutually illuminating theses: first I explain why  well informed eighteenth-century thinkers, e.g., the pre-critical Immanuel Kant and Richard Bentley, who had a very important correspondence with Newton, would have identified important aspects of Newton’s natural philosophy with (a species of modern) Epicureanism. Second, I explore how some significant changes to Newton’s Principia between the first (1687) and second (1713) editions can be explained in terms of attempts to reframe the Principia so that the charge of “Epicureanism” can be deflected.​[2]​ In order to account for this I call attention to significant political and theological changes in the wake of the Glorious Revolution; as has been documented by others, it turns out that Bentley plays a non-trivial role in these matters. Third, I argue that there is an argument in Kant’s (1755) Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens that undermines a key claim in Newton’s General Scholium. I suggest that this particular argument reopens the door to Epicurean “blind necessity,” in particular, Spinozism.​[3]​ 

This paper consists of three sections. First, I show that the Principia was explicitly associated with Epicureanism in various ways by the pre-critical Kant and Bentley. This is prima facie puzzling because the General Scholium seems to argue straightforwardly against Epicureanism. To explain this puzzle, I show how the mathematical-physical core of the Principia could and was plausibly read as a tract in which Epicurean themes could be discerned (regardless of Newton’s intentions), even if the General Scholium appears to disown that reading of the book. In particular, in addition to some substantial doctrines that are often associated with Epicureanism, I call attention to the fact that the Principia’s first edition starts (viz., Halley’s Ode) and ends (Newton’s treatment of comets) with highly Epicurean themes. This section aims to contribute to a better understanding of the reception of Newton’s views on gravity and action at a distance because Kant and Bentley both discern in Newton an Epicurean conception of gravity. 

Second, I explain how many changes to the Principia resulted in a new framing of the book in the second (and third) edition(s). I focus on the General Scholium, but my argument calls attention to a host of significant changes between the first and second editions. By focusing on the political and theological context of Bentley’s correspondence with Newton, I also explain why Newton would have been motivated to alter the Principia in non-trivial ways. So, this section means to contribute to a scholarly literature that recognizes the development of Newton’s views. 

Third, I argue that despite explicit efforts to distance himself from Epicureanism, Kant’s Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (hereafter UNH) re-opens the door to what one might call neo-Epicureanism by undermining the General Scholium’s strongest argument against it. By comparing the General Scholium with an argument by Clarke from  A demonstration of the being and attributes of God I argue that the target of Newton’s argument is Spinozism; so this paper is also meant to contribute to research on Newton’s and Kant’s engagement with Spinozism. For, while one can see “Spinozism” and “Epicureanism” as radically different traditions, in the early modern period they sometimes got linked as defending “blind metaphysical necessity.”​[4]​ In particular, I call attention to non-trivial allusions to Spinozism in UNH.

I: The ascription of Epicureanism to Newton’s Principia

In this section, I show that the Principia was explicitly associated with Epicureanism in various ways. I focus on the pre-critical Kant and Bentley, but they were not alone in this. For example, Adam Smith also links Newton to an Epicurean-atomist tradition in his important piece, “Of the External Senses.”​[5]​ Smith’s essay and Kant’s UNH were both written early in their careers before 1755; Smith’s piece appeared only in the 1790s (posthumously). Kant’s UNH seems to have appeared in the mid 1760s.​[6]​ There is no evidence of mutual influence. But there may well have been common sources. For example, in his famous correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz repeatedly links Newton’s position to Epicurean tradition.​[7]​








Immanuel Kant’s Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (UNH) is now primarily known for its pioneering contribution to speculative cosmology and cosmogony. In Kant scholarship it plays an important role in debates over Kant’s so-called ‘conversion’ to Newton. Here I focus on narrower theme in it. At the start of the work, Kant raises the specter of Epicureanism.​[9]​ I quote two passages before commenting on them:

[1] “If the planetary structure, with all its order and beauty, is only an effect of the universal laws of motion in matter left to itself, if the blind mechanism of natural forces knows how to develop itself out of chaos in such a marvelous way and to reach such perfection on its own, then the proof of the primordial Divine Author which we derive from a glance at the beauty of the cosmic structure is wholly discredited, nature is self-sufficient [selbst genugsam], the divine rule is unnecessary, Epicurus lives once again in the midst of Christendom, and an unholy worldly-wisdom [Weltweisheit] treads underfoot the faith which proffers a bright light to illuminate it.” (UNH Preface)​[10]​

[2] “But the defence of your system, it will be said, is at the same time a defence of the opinions of Epicurus, to which it has the closest similarity. I will not completely deny all agreement with him. Many people have become atheists through the apparent truth of such reasons which, with a more scrupulous consideration, could have convinced them as forcibly as possible of the certain existence of the Highest Being... I will also not deny that the theory of Lucretius or of his predecessors (Epicurus, Leucippus, and Democritus) has much similarity to mine. Like those natural philosophers [Weltweise], I set out the first condition of nature as that state of the world consisting of a universal scattering of the primordial materials of all planetary bodies, or atoms, as they were called by these. Epicurus proposes a principle of heaviness which drives these elementary particles downwards, and this appears not very different from Newton’s power of attraction, which I assume. He also assigned to these particles a certain deviation from the straight linear movement of their descent, although at the same time he had an absurd picture of the cause and consequences of this deviation. This deviation comes about to some extent with the alteration in the straight linear descent, a change which we derive from the force of repulsion of the particles. Finally, came the eddies, which arose from the confused movement of the atoms, a major part of the theories of Leucippus and Democritus. We will meet them also in our theory. But such a close affinity with a theory which was the true theory of atheism in ancient times does not lead mine to be grouped in the company of their errors...” (UNH preface)​[11]​

In the first quote Kant associates Epicureanism with the view of nature that is self-sufficient, that is, one in which there is only “blind mechanism.” In particular, Epicureanism is said to embrace the idea that the laws of motion can account for the origin of the present planetary structure from unordered (“chaos”) beginnings. In the second quote, Kant allows that the system he will put forward has a close resemblance to an ancient atomist-atheist tradition in four important features: i) the beginning of the universe consists of scattered atoms; ii) these atoms have an innate downward motion; iii) this motion deviates from a straight line; iv) the world consists of vortices. Kant admits that the second resemblance has a close kinship to Newtonian attraction. Moreover, Kant offers a basically Newtonian reinterpretation of the Epicurean causal analysis of the third feature. 

One might immediately object to my more general thesis – that Kant closely identifies his own Newtonian inspired cosmology with epicurean themes – that in the second quote Kant embraces a vortex theory. After all, the objector would argue, Newton criticizes the vortex theory in detail in Book II and the General Scholium of the Principia (“the hypothesis of vortices is beset with many difficulties.”) But a closer look at Kant’s text reveals that the only role vortices play is as an important intermediary step between the chaotic origins and the clustering of matter in stable orbits.​[12]​ In context Kant leaves no doubt that he accepts vast empty spaces beyond the solar system, and considerable empty space within it—both orthodox Newtonian positions; so he is no Cartesian-Leibnizian vortex theorist! So, of the four Epicurean features mentioned in the second quote, the middle two have Newtonian analogues; the last is at least compatible with Newtonianism (and may even be thought of as a creative extension of Newtonian theory with Newtonian tools!) This provides prima facie evidence for my general thesis that at least at one stage of his career, Kant explicitly associated significant features of the Newtonian natural philosophy with Epicurean commitments. Of course, in the Principia (but not elsewhere) Newton is silent on the origin of the universe.  I return to Newtonian cosmogony in the final section of this paper.

The first quote might be thought to generate another objection to my general thesis. For it can be interpreted as suggesting that if Epicureanism is accepted then prominent Newton arguments are refuted. For, the rejection of divine providence (that is, the universe reached its present “perfection” by itself) and the refutation of an argument for God’s existence from the appearance of cosmic beauty both can be said to target Newton’s claims in the General Scholium (“this most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being”). In fact, the language with which the Epicurean position  is described by Kant in the first quote [“die blinde Mechanik der Naturkräfte”] echoes the way Newton articulates the “blind metaphysical view” view he opposes (“a God without dominion, providence, and final causes is nothing other than fate and nature”). 

But this objection is really an argument for my thesis. For, in both quotes from Kant’s UNH, positions that can be ascribed to the body of the Principia (especially the first edition) are associated with Epicureanism, while the anti-Epicurean claims echo the General Scholium (and other editorial material to be discussed below) added to the second edition.​[13]​ To put the thesis of this paper starkly: without the General Scholium (added to the second edition) the Principia can -- and was -- naturally read as a neo-Epicurean tract. My argument does not require that all informed readers would have discerned Epicurean themes in the Principiain his correspondence with Huygens, Leibniz, for example, originally associated the Principia with a discarded Stoic cosmology. Of course, my argument below must also account for the fact that despite the presence of the General Scholium, people continued to attribute Epicurean themes to Newton.

There is a third quote from Kant’s UNH that may seem even more problematic for the thesis developed in this paper:

[3] “Everything flows from it [the Godhead] according to unchanging laws which thus must display nothing other than appropriate [“welche darum lauter Geschicktes darstellen müssen”], because they are exclusively features of the wisest of all designs from which disorder is prohibited. The chance collisions [ohngefäre Zusammenlauf] of the atoms of Lucretius did not develop the world. Implanted forces and laws which have their source in the Wisest Intelligence were an unchanging origin of that order inevitably flowing out from nature, not by chance, but by necessity.” (UNH Part 2, chapter 7)​[14]​

Kant contrasts (Lucretian) “chance” and “disorder” with law-governed “necessity” and “order.” Kant claims that necessity and order are the product of divine design.  Kant’s emphasis on the forces and laws’ origin in “wisest intelligence” echoes Newton’s “General Scholium.” So, this fits my general thesis that the parts of Kant’s UNH that are anti-Epicurean are indebted to the General Scholium. 

Nevertheless, there are three complications: first, the historical Lucretius also insists that “law presides over the whole creation;” he identifies law (lex) with necessity (necessum)! (See De Rerum Natura, Book V.56-57). So, while in this quote for Kant there may be an opposition between the doctrines of chance and necessity, it is by no means obvious that others would have read Lucretius similarly. More important, Kant had already identified Epicureanism with law-governed “blind  mechanism,” (recall the first quote above), so in this third quote, his treatment of Lucretius as defending “chance collision” as contrasted with law-governed necessity is at variance with himself and the normal way of treating these matters.​[15]​ For example, in his exchange with Leibniz, Clarke explicitly equates “Epicurean chance” with “blind necessity”.​[16]​ 

Second, in isolation the passage from Kant could be read as claiming that God implants order and necessity from outside of nature.​[17]​ This, too, sounds like Newton’s claims in the Principia’s “General Scholium.”​[18]​ Yet as Schönfeld has persuasively argued, UNH as a whole seems to suggest that Kant’s God is immanent in nature.​[19]​ Surprisingly enough this, too, echoes the “General Scholium” of the Principia, where “necessarily” existing God is said to be “omnipresent,” “substantially” and “virtually.” Newton’s anti-Trinitarian God is, thus, spatially extended and also immanent in nature and closely identified with necessity.​[20]​ That is to say, in Kant and Newton the language of design/intelligence is compatible with an immanent God. These two points relate to a third complication: in a famous letter to Bentley (to be discussed throughout this paper), Newton writes, “Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws; but whether this agent be material or immaterial I have left to the consideration of my reader.” Many interpreters think that Newton is alluding here to God’s active role in the universe. What is less noticed is that if Newton is alluding to God’s activity, he is insisting that God’s activity is entirely law-governed (“an agent acting constantly according to certain laws”). So, the language of design is compatible with an immanent God that is in some sense subservient to law. Something akin to this -- law-abiding God -- doctrine is, in fact, articulated by Halley in the opening stanza of his very Epicurean ode to Newton at the start of the Principia:​[21]​ “Behold set out for you the pattern of the Heavens, and the balances of divine Mass, and indeed the Calculation of Jove; Laws which the all-producing Creator, when he was fashioning the first-beginnings of things, wished not to violate and established as the foundations of his eternal work.” (I discuss the significance of Halley’s ode to the argument of this paper below.) My preferred way of interpreting the cumulative impact of these three complications is to suggest that Kant sets up an opposition between Lucretian “chance” and his own law-governed view of nature, to draw attention away from the fact that by his very lights his own view is “Epicurean” in non trivial ways. (Of course, being law-governed is compatible with alternative systems, too.) But not much hinges on this in subsequent argument.





The identification between Epicurean innate gravity and Newtonian attraction occurred to an early and significant reader of the Principia: Richard Bentley. After Bentley presented his Boyle lectures (so-called because they were funded through a bequest from Boyle’s last will), Bentley contacted Newton before he produced final revisions to the published text of these lectures. Bentley’s side of the correspondence (as well as presumably the lecture-manuscript) is lost with the exception of one letter. 

Even so, we can infer from the responses by Newton (which were appended to the published version of Bentley’s Boyle lectures) to the now lost letters from Bentley, that Bentley repeatedly attributed Epicurean innate gravity to Newton.​[22]​ In a very famous passage in the fourth and final letter, Newton strongly resisted the attribution: “It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must do if gravitation, in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it. And this is one reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate gravity to me.” (Newton 2004: 102-2) 

Ever since Maxwell in the nineteenth century, the passage has been at the core of recent interpretive disputes over Newton’s commitment to action at a distance and his matter theory.​[23]​ Just about the only thing not under dispute is that Newton rejects the attribution of gravity as an essential and inherent property of matter. Here I do not restate my interpretation of this passage. But it is worth emphasizing that scholars tend to quote the passage selectively.​[24]​ Even a careful scholar such as Schönfeld, quotes only part of the first sentence, “It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact” and omits the part about Epicurus!​[25]​ So, the question of Epicureanism is not explored in Schönfeld’s interpretation of Kant’s pre-critical period.​[26]​

Now, “Epicureanism” was often used rather loosely during the period as a term of abuse (akin to the way “atheist,” “Hobbist,” “Pappist,” or “Spinozist” could be used). But in the exchange between Newton and Bentley, “Epicureanism” has a very precise meaning for Newton: it is associated with the system that attributes gravity to an innate and essential (we would say intrinsic) property of matter. Moreover, from Newton’s response to Bentley’s first letter, we can infer that in his response to the Principia, Bentley had supposed that “every particle had a innate gravity towards all the rest.” (Newton 2004: 94)​[27]​ Bentley, who was about thirty when he wrote Newton, was not a naïve reader of the Ancients. He had just established himself as the leading classicist of England after publishing Epistola ad Johannem Millium (1691).​[28]​ 

So, in what follows I explore, first, what in the body of the Principia could have made Bentley discern Epicureanism in it. Second, by exploring the intellectual and cultural context of Newton’s correspondence with Bentley, I argue that Newton had every reason to be extremely alarmed by Bentley’s attribution of Epicurean doctrine to the Principia.  


II: The Principia’s Epicureanism.

The association of Newton with Epicureanism is prima facie puzzling because the General Scholium seems to argue straightforwardly against Epicureanism (the system of “blind metaphysical necessity.”)​[29]​ Moreover, Epicureanism was not known for promoting mathematical sciences. To explain this puzzle, I show how the mathematical-physical core of the Principia could and was plausibly read as a tract in which Epicurean themes could be discerned (regardless of Newton’s intentions). 

So, in this section, I explore three related issues: first, I list the dramatic changes to the Principia between the first and second editions. I do this to motivate, second, a new look at how the first edition of the Principia would have looked to its early readers (and explain why readers accustomed to the third edition only and blind to the original political context would find such an Epicurean reading surprising). I argue that stripped from its many subsequent changes the first Principia can plausibly read along Epicurean lines. Third, I argue that a considerable number of these changes might well have been motivated by Newton’s desire to prevent an Epicurean reading.​[30]​ In particular, I argue that Newton would have every reason to be alarmed by Bentley’s attribution of Epicureanism to Newton—Bentley was not merely a classicist. He was extremely well connected and powerful politically and together with his patron, Edward Stillingfleet, he prevented Newton’s friend Edmund Halley from obtaining the Savilian Professorship of Astronomy at Oxford a year before the correspondence with Newton. In claiming this, I draw on existing scholarship, but I do challenge a recurring theme in Newton scholarship: that Bentley would have been handpicked by Newton to deliver the inaugural Boyle lecture.​[31]​

IIA: Non-trivial changes to the Principia.

While both Fatio de Dullier and Richard Gregory were involved in preparing an aborted, second edition of the Principia during the 1690s, the second edition of the Principia was eventually published more than a quarter-century after the first under the very able editorial guidance of Roger Cotes. In addition to a lot of small corrections to the wording and mathematical proofs of the Principia (and some comments pertaining to the calculus controversy with Leibniz), we can identify nine significant changes to the Principia: 1) there are lots of new experimental results, especially in Book II on resistance;​[32]​ 2) there are new empirical results on planetary orbits and the shortening of pendulum at the equator that strengthen Newton’s argument against Huygens’s criticism of universal gravity;​[33]​ 3) Newton added important material based on his way of measuring the “crookedness” of a curve using an osculating circle;​[34]​ 4) Newton largely removes the language of “hypotheses” from the Principia. In particular, the nine “hypotheses” that were listed at the start of Book III of the first edition of the Principia, were split into three “rules of reasoning” (the fourth rule was added to the third edition) and “six phenomena.”​[35]​ These four particular changes will not play a major role in what follows.

However, from the point of view of this paper’s argument, there are five other non-trivial changes between the first and second edition of the Principia: 5) Halley’s ode to Newton was heavily edited by Richard Bentley; 6) Cotes added a new, polemical preface; 7) Newton removed one hypothesis (concerning the nature of matter) entirely; the seventh is connected to 8) Newton made significant adjustments in his ‘matter-theory;’ 9) Newton added a whole new conclusion to the book, the General Scholium. All these changes can be understood in light of Newton’s attempt to distance the Principia from the attribution of Epicureanism, although I do not mean to be understood as claiming that all of these are motivated exclusively (or in some cases even primarily) with concerns over the attribution of Epicureanism. Clearly debates with Leibniz and his followers also account for some of these changes.​[36]​ But the issues are not unrelated, because one of the charges that Leibniz pressed against Newton in the correspondence with Clarke (which appeared after the second edition) was that he seemed to embrace Epicureanism.​[37]​ 

In what follows, my strategy will be to explain why the first edition can be read as offering an Epicurean account and along the way discuss how these five alterations respond to that. In particular, there are ten aspects of the first edition of the Principia that I will single out as encouraging an Epicurean reading: i) it embraces infinity of space; ii) it asserts a vacuum; iii) it flirts with atomism; iv) it embraces a strong homogeneity of matter thesis; v) it appears to embrace action at a distance (and universal gravity); vi) it is naturalistic, by which I mean that God (and his providence) is almost entirely absent from the book (the exception will be significant); vii) Halley’s ode to Newton is not only modeled on Lucretius but also presents Epicurean (and blasphemous) themes; viii) the book ends with a mathematical treatment of comets such that comets are law-governed entities (and not portends of the Gods) and these play a non-trivial role in cosmic economy; ix) Newton embraces life on other planets and plurality of worlds (although this will also cause a wrinkle in my argument). In addition x) together, vii) and viii) frame the Principia such that classically Epicurean themes can be said to bookend the work. Such literary framing is significant because few readers then (nor now) would have been able to understand most of the technical claims in the body of the Principia.​[38]​ To be clear, these ten aspects do not force an Epicurean reading on the reader of the Principia; they are compatible with other readings (including Leibniz’s original Stoicizing interpretation). But they are also more than highly suggestive of Epicurean themes. 





IIB: Ten Epicurean Themes in the Principia. 

In this section I provide evidence for ten Epicurean themes in the Principia. I also discuss the fate of some of these in subsequent editions (and I call attention to their presence in Kant’s UNH in accompanying footnotes). First, Newton embraced the infinity of space right at the start of the Principia: “Now no other places are immovable but those that, from infinity to infinity [ab infinito in infinitum], do all retain the same given position one to another, and upon this account must ever remain unmoved and do thereby constitute immovable space,” (Principia, scholium to the definitions).​[41]​ This is a core Newtonian commitment unchanged through all the editions. It is not by itself a distinctively Epicurean commitment (even Scholastics could embrace varieties of it), but when combined with a commitment to a vacuum, atomism, and homogeneity of matter, it becomes more emblematically Epicurean. 

Second, there can be little doubt that Newton embraced the possibility of a vacuum.​[42]​ A doctrine traditionally associated with Epicureanism (as Leibniz points out in his second response to Clarke, paragraph 2 (23)). In the Principia some characteristic passages are these: “The hypotheses of vortices can in no way be reconciled with astronomical phenomena and serves less to clarify the celestial motions than to obscure them. But how those motions are performed in free spaces without vortices can be understood from Book I and will now be shown more fully in Book 3 on the system of the world” (Book 2, section 9, scholium). These are the concluding lines of Book 2 of the Principia. In Book 3, Newton writes, “it is evident that the celestial spaces are void of resistance,” (Book 3, Lemma 4, cor. 3). “And thus a vacuum is necessary.” (Book 3, proposition 6, corollary 3; I return to this passage below). This last corollary was heavily re-written in later editions, but always asserting vacuum.​[43]​ Finally, “in the heavens, which are void of air and exhalations, the planets and comets, encountering no sensible resistance, will move through those spaces for a very long time” (Book 3, proposition 10, theorem 10; this is the corollary just before the proposition that asserts universal gravity, so it would have been noticed by anybody interested in the nature of gravity.) The natural reading of these passages is that space is largely empty. They also constrain quite dramatically the nature of any ether (Newton explicitly entertained an ether in the Queries of the Opticks): it must have near negligible mass and be practically frictionless.​[44]​ 

As a tantalizing aside: Newton’s treatment of the vacuum is connected with a little-noticed, circumstantial evidence for my thesis about the changes to the Principia (as being motivated, in part, by the desire to distance the book from charge of Epicureanism): Robert Boyle gets mentioned explicitly in the Principia only from the second edition onward. These mentions occur in two of the notable additions of the Principia. First, Newton writes in the “General Scholium “with the air removed, as it is in Boyle’s vacuum, resistance ceases, since a tenuous feather and solid gold fall with equal velocity in such a vacuum.” This reference to Boyle’s air-pump echoes Cotes’ “Preface:” “Now, that all falling bodies universally are equally accelerated is evident from this, that in the vacuum produced by Boyle’s air pump (that is, with the resistance of air removed), they describe, in falling, equal spaces in equal times, and this is proved more exactly by experiments with pendulums.” For, Boyle is a convenient authority if one is eager to distance one’s defense of the vacuum from the (potential) charge of (Atheist) Epicureanism from a Boyle lecturer (i.e., Bentley).​[45]​ 

Third, Newton’s cautious embrace of atomism is well known from the Opticks, where he writes: “the small Particles of Bodies” that have “certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a distance, not only upon the Rays of Light for reflecting, refracting and inflecting them, but also upon one another for producing a great Part of the Phenomena of Nature.” (Query 31, Opticks). But, of course, corpuscularianism, which is compatible with infinite division of matter, need not be identical to atomism, which embraces perfectly hard smallest particles. In the Opticks, perfectly “hard bodies” out of which other bodies are composed are presented as possible and likely (364ff; 370; 375-8). So, it is no surprise that Newton’s position was associated with atomism.​[46]​

Newton’s atomism is more evident in correspondence with Cotes during the editorial activity leading up to the second edition of the Principia: “A body is condensed by the contraction of the pores in it, and when it has no more pores (because of the impenetrability of matter) it can be condensed no more.”​[47]​ But this material was not available during the 18th century.

It is, however, much harder to find a clear statement of atomism in the first edition of the Principia. In fact, Newton’s atomism is hidden from view, but there is an already quoted passage that can be shown to assume it: “And thus a vacuum is necessary. For if all spaces were full, the specific gravity of the fluid with which the region of the air would be filled, because of the extreme density of its matter, would not be less than the specific gravity of quicksilver or of gold or of any other body with the greatest density, and therefore neither gold nor any other body could descend in air.” (Book 3, Proposition 6, corollary 3, reworked in later editions, but the core counterfactual claim remains.)​[48]​ Newton’s argument is by no means obvious to all readers.​[49]​ In an unpublished thesis my former student, Wouter Valentin, has offered a reconstruction of the counterfactual that shows it presupposes atomism. Here I offer the main outline of Valentin’s four-fold reconstruction of Newton’s argument: 1. There is an unperceivable micro-level and a perceivable macro-level;  2. A) there is a counterfactual situation on the micro-level (“if all spaces were full”), which presupposes a homogeneity of matter (i.e., when spaces are fully filled it has greatest density (more about this below)); 2B) by way of a perceived situation on the macro-level one infers a connection between the micro and macro levels [that is, transduction].  3. Rather than [i] inferring that empty spaces in matter explains the enormous variety in the density of perceived (macro-level) matter, one infers that [ii] fully compressed matter in empty space [“a vacuum is necessary”] explains the enormous variety in the density of perceived macro-level matter. 4. 3[ii] is atomism. 

Fourth, in the first edition of the Principia Newton embraces a strong homogeneity of matter thesis: “Every body can be transformed into a body of any other kind and successively take on all the intermediate degrees of qualities,” (Book 3, Hypothesis 3).​[50]​ Now some commentators have seen in this hypothesis evidence of Newton’s alchemical interests.​[51]​ But Newton kept his (now well-documented) alchemical interests a well guarded secret from most of his contemporaries. Moreover, the hypothesis is really a mainstay of the new anti-Scholastic modern philosophy. This is exemplified by the fact that Newton only uses the hypothesis in the proof that shows there are no forms (Book 3, prop. 6, corol 2). The hypothesis is, in fact, one of the most significant Epicurean legacies among a wide variety of New Philosophers.​[52]​ In UNH Kant also endorses the claim that fundamentally, all material is alike: “I assume that all the matter making up the spheres belonging to our solar system, all the planets and comets, at the origin of all things was broken down into its elementary basic material and filled the entire space of the cosmic structure in which these developed bodies now move around.” (Part two, chapter 1, 275 (263)) All visible differences are evolved from it. In UNH Kant echoes the transformation thesis of the third hypothesis: “And should not other planets be gradually changing into comets by means of a series of intermediate types approximating the composition of comets and linking together the family of planets with the family of comets?” (Part 1, 268; (257-8)​[53]​

I call the third hypothesis a ‘thick’ homogeneity of matter thesis to distinguish it from a thinner homogeneity of matter thesis that remains in all of the Principia’s editions. For, of course ‘mass’ is a quality that all bodies have in common. Newton officially dropped Hypothesis 3 in subsequent editions of the Principia.​[54]​ Of course, all kinds of early modern philosophers could embrace the homogeneity of matter. For example, Spinoza also could embrace it (see Ethics, part II, Lemmas I-II). But this did not, of course, entail that they were in other respects Epicurean. Spinoza (whose anthropology and critique of religion has, of course, many Epicurean overtones) ridiculed the Epicurean doctrine of seeds in Ethics, Part I, Proposition 7, Scholium 2. Now it is well known that when Newton and David Gregory were busy preparing an aborted second edition, Newton studied Lucretius and the Epicurean tradition more generally intensely. He seems to have thought he could deflect the charge of atheism from Lucretius and Epicurus.​[55]​ Nevertheless, from this period stems a remark by Gregory, “This the Cartesians will easily concede. But not the Peripatetics, who make a specific difference between the celestial and terrestrial matter. Nor the followers of the Epicurean Philosophy, who make atoms and seeds of things immutable,” (Gregory on hypothesis 3, quoted from Cohen 1999: 203). I take this as evidence that in the aftermath of the exchange with Bentley, some people in the circle of Newton wanted to distance the Newtonian project from Epicureanism.​[56]​ Not unlike Spinoza, Gregory calls attention to the doctrine of seeds to distinguish Newtonianism from Epicureanism. But it is by no means obvious that Gregory can succeed at this distancing. For, as we have seen it is not so easy to deny that Newton has embraced atoms, which is, in fact, quite compatible with the hypothesis 3. Below I argue that Newton also accepts something close to the doctrine of seeds.

Fifth, the official doctrine of the Principia on the cause of attraction is an agnostic one. In all three editions of the body of the Principia, Newton explains what he means by “attraction:”

“I use the word ‘attraction’ here in a general sense for any endeavor whatever of bodies to approach one another, whether that endeavor occurs as a result of [i] the action of the bodies either drawn toward one another or [ii] acting on one another by means of spirits emitted or [iii] whether it arises from the action of aether or [iv] of an air or [v] any medium whatsoever—whether corporeal or incorporeal—in any way impelling toward one another the bodies floating therein,” (Book 1, Section 11, Scholium).

Newton allows that “attraction” can be caused by many possible mechanisms. So, Newton’s famous claim in the “General Scholium,” “But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phænomena,”​[57]​ is no change of position and in complete accord with the quote from Book 1, Section 11, Scholium. But it is no surprise that Leibniz and Huygens thought that Newton embraced action at a distance, for [i], [iii], and [v] are all compatible with it. We can infer from Newton’s first response to Bentley’s first letter (now lost) that Bentley also ascribed “an innate gravity” to “every particle” towards “all the rest.” (Newton 2004: 94). That is, Bentley’s original interpretationembraces the first option listed by Newton. 

So, despite Newton’s official anachronism, many of his original readers were inclined to read him as committed to a metaphysical doctrine. I suspect the reason for this is the manner in which Definition 8 of the Principia is worded:

“accelerative force [may be referred to], the place of the body as a certain efficacy diffused from the center through each of the surrounding places in order to move the bodies that are in those places; and the absolute force [may be referred], to the center as having some cause without which the motive forces are not propagated through the surrounding regions, whether this cause is some central body (such as the lodestone in the center of a magnetic force or the earth in the center of a force that produces gravity) or whether it is some other cause which is not apparent” (Newton 1999: 407–408).

Even today many of the best readers of Newton think that Newton is committed here to the claim that a single particle generates a force field in the places around it.​[58]​ So, what Newton and his interlocutors call “innate” gravity is a very reasonable inference of Newton’s position. Even so, it goes against the third law of motion, which is cashed out in terms of interactions. That this is true even for gravity becomes fully clear with the third rule of reasoning, which was added to the second edition; it shows that the ascription of universal qualities is really to – to use David Miller’s apt phrase -- systems of bodies.​[59]​ For in that rule, Newton allows that gravity is a “universal quality” of bodies (note the plural throughout the rule), but he explicitly denies that gravity is “essential” (we would say intrinsic) to bodies. That is, it is a contingent fact that gravity is universal. (This claim is compatible with two further hypotheses: first, that God has superadded gravity; second, that gravity is a relational quality.) 

Sixth, the first edition of the Principia is a surprisingly naturalistic book. By which I mean that God plays a negligible role in it. This goes against some very prominent recent scholarship that emphasizes the theological aspects of Newton.​[60]​ But most such arguments rely on the correspondence with Bentley and the “General Scholium” (as well as Newton’s voluminous theological manuscripts). I have found only one mention of God in the first edition of the Principia: “Therefore God placed the planet at different distances from the sun so that each one might, according to the degree of density, enjoy a greater or smaller amount of heat from the sun.” (Book 3, proposition 8, corollary 5; Newton 1999: 814) As Bernard Cohen argues, Huygens certainly saw the implications of the argument while commenting on proposition 8 that it showed what kind of gravity “the inhabitants of Jupiter and Saturn would feel” (quoted in Cohen Newton 1999: 219). 

Despite the fact that the argument was removed after the first editions, Kant also saw the argument: “Newton, who established the density of some planets by calculation, thought that the cause of this relationship set according to the distance was to be found in the appropriateness of God’s choice and in the fundamental motives of His final purpose, since the planets closer to the sun must endure more solar heat and those further away are to manage with a lower level of heat.”​[61]​ (UNH, Part 2, section 2, 284-85 (271)

As Kant implies, Newton’s claim in the proposition certainly suggests a design argument.​[62]​ But it is not anthropocentric. The anti-anthropocentric version of the argument is even echoed in the General Scholium, which calls attention to the significance of that particular “diversity of natural things which we find, suited to different times and places.” The anti- anthropocentricism runs through the General Scholium. In particular, the beauty of our solar system is mimicked by countless other solar systems, too far apart to be of interest to us.​[63]​ Moreover, natural diversity is suited to times and places regardless of human interest. Kant’s UNH echoes this anti-anthropocentrism design argument,​[64]​ but -- as I show in the final section -- with a Spinozistic twist.

Proposition 8 was reworded without mention of God in the second edition in the Principia. Interestingly enough, in the original draft version of Newton’s system of the world, the posthumously published Treatise on System of the World the same claim is treated in conditional form: “If God has plac’d different bodies at different distances from the Sun, so as the denser always possess the nearer places, and each body enjoys a heat suitable to its condition, and proper for its nourishment” (34).​[65]​ 

Now what makes these not-so-subtle changes significant is a surprising fact: through all three editions of the Principia Newton called attention to the existence of this suppressed draft. In the published introduction to Book III of the Principia, Newton writes he suppressed his Treatise in order to “avoid lengthy disputes” with others’ “preconceptions” (Newton 1999: 793). So, when the Treatise did finally appear shortly after Newton’s death, inquisitive readers could use it as a guide to what they took to be Newton’s original views.

Seventh, the first thing that people would encounter when reading the Principia is Halley’s ode to Newton. It was clearly modeled on Lucretius’ praise of Epicurus.​[66]​ Now as Albury hasshown, the ode was heavily edited and revised in the second edition of the Principia by Bentley.​[67]​ As Albury has also demonstrated, much of the content of the ode is also Epicurean. For example, consider the following lines:
	
“Behold set out for you the pattern of the Heavens, and the balances of divine Mass, and indeed the Calculation of Jove; Laws which the all-producing Creator, when he was fashioning the first-beginnings of things, wished not to violate and established as the foundations of his eternal work…. No longer does error oppress doubtful mankind with its darkness: the keenness of a sublime Intellect has allowed us to penetrate the dwellings of the Gods [Superum] and to scale the heights of Heaven,” (Halley’s ode).​[68]​

In Halley’s rendition, God follows the (eternal?) laws of nature. Throughout the Ode, there is no sign that God the creator [Demiurge] needs to intervene in his own making. More important, he uses the plural “Gods.”  I single out these lines because in 1691 they were used to create the charge against Halley “for asserting eternity of the world.” Halley’s candidacy for the Savilian Chair of Astronomy at Oxford was rejected (Albury, 37). As Albury points out Halley’s Epicureanism was not disguised and it was used against him. Leading the charge were Bentley and his mentor Stillingfleet, who is known today, if at all, among philosophers for his correspondence with Locke, but who was one of the most powerful clergyman in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution (1688). As a young man, Bentley had lived with Stillingfleet for several years.​[69]​ The front page of the published version of Bentley’s first Boyle Lectures identifies Bentley as “Chaplain to Right Reverend Father in God, Edward, Lord Bishop of Worcester” that is, Stillingfleet.

Halley’s commitment to the eternity of the world (“cf. “the unchanging order of things”) is revealed in the following, blasphemous passages in the Ode:

“Arise, Mortals, throw off earthly cares; and discern herein the powers of a heaven-born Mind, far and away remote from the life of the beasts. He who commanded men, by written Tablets, to curb Murder, Theft and Adultery, and crimes of perjured Deceit; or who Counseled nomad peoples to establish walled Cities; or who blessed the nations with the gift of Ceres; or who pressed from the grape relief from cares; or who showed how to combine pictured sounds upon a Nile reed, and to exhibit Voices to the eyes--each of these improved the lot of mankind less, in only looking to a few benefits for the unhappiness of life. But now we are truly admitted as table-guests of the Gods; we are allowed to examine the Laws of the high heavens; and now are exposed the hidden strongholds of the secret Earth, and the unchanging order of things,” (Halley’s Ode).

Now Newton’s divinity might be brushed off as a rhetorical flourish. But Halley comes very close to suggesting that Revelation seems to have human origins; he clearly suggests that the Gospel is not mankind’s greatest gift.

Eight, in his “Ode,” Halley writes “Now is revealed what the bending path of horrifying comets is; no longer do we marvel at the Appearances of the bearded Star. “ As Albury has documented, this line was removed by Bentley in the second edition. In it, Halley draws on the classic Epicurean argument that religious superstition is caused by and causes ongoing fear. In the “Ode,” Halley, thus, calls attention to one of the most significant achievements by Newton: the last propositions of the Principia provide a (rather complex) procedure to calculate and predict the orbits of comets. Thus, in the first edition, the Principia closes on a series of propositions that in Halley’s way of framing them allow one to tame the causes of superstition.​[70]​ In Newton’s hands comets are not supernatural portents, but a “kind of planet revolving about the sun in very eccentric orbits,” (Newton 1999: 928; Book III, Proposition 41, problem 21).​[71]​

Moreover, in the closing pages of the first edition of the Principia, Newton inserted the following connected speculations:

“for the conservation of the seas and fluids on the planets, comets seems to be required, so that from the condensation of their exhalations and vapors, there can be a continual supply and renewal of whatever liquid is consumed by vegetation and putrefaction and converted into a dry earth….I suspect that it is chiefly from the comets that spirit comes, which is indeed the smallest but the most subtle and useful part of our air, and so much required to sustain the life of all things with us.” (Newton 1999: 926; III, proposition 41, problem 21) 

In this passage Newton is committed to multiple worlds (as we have seen this is a doctrine he would magnify in the General Scholium). In Newton’s view, comets play an indispensable part in, what one may term, the economy of nature. They transfer essential material throughout the solar system. Echoing the providential argument of corollary 5 to Proposition 8 Book 3 (quoted above), comets play a purposive role in maintaining nature’s equilibrium on various “planets.” Again, this is an anti-anthropocentric argument. Most importantly, comets play a role in circulating the building blocks of life.​[72]​ This has a very Epicurean ring to it; Lucretius also insists that the infinite celestial heavens are the source of Earthly life (see, especially the end of Book II of De Rerum Natura). So, it is no surprise that discerning readers would have interpreted Newton as an Epicurean! 

Now, Newton is silent on the particulars of the Lucretian theory of seeds, so one can understand why Gregory would have been tempted to explore it as a way to distinguish Newton from Epicureans.​[73]​ But Newton does not rule out seeds. Of course, Gregory could point to other aspects of the Principia that definitely seem un-Epicurean; for example, Newton seems to have no interest in moral philosophy. 

None of the points listed in this section by itself would settle the case for an Epicurean reading of the first edition of the Principia. But it should be clear that, especially in light of Halley’s opening Ode and the closing pages on comets, their cumulative effect would have made the Principia seem like a (perhaps innovatively mathematical, modern) Epicurean tract to a reader more interested in metaphysics and theology than in solving the sophisticated mathematical-empirical problems that Newton bequeathed to future generations.

IIC: The Correspondence with Bentley, Reconsidered.

The aim of the previous section was to try to explain why knowledgeable readers would have discerned Epicurean commitments in the first edition of the Principia. But they also are meant to lay the ground for a reconsideration of Newton’s correspondence with Bentley and its significance for the reception of and changes to future editions of the Principia. This correspondence has played two significant roles in recent scholarship of Newton: i) to motivate interpretations of Newton’s views on action at a distance; ii) to motivate interpretations of Newton’s views on theology.​[74]​

There has been surprisingly little attention to the circumstances of the exchange between Newton and Bentley. As I indicated above, Bentley was not just an ambitious young intellectual who contacted Isaac Newton for some feedback on his arguments between the spoken and printed version of his Boyle lectures. He was the protégé of the most powerful clergy of England after the Glorious Revolution. While Stillingfleet and his Latitudinarian comrades promoted interest in natural philosophy and were relatively tolerant about doctrinal differences, their successful opposition to Halley’s appointment at Oxford also shows the limits of their tolerance. In particular, the circle around Stillingfleet promoted a providential interpretation of the Glorious Revolution and a natural religion in accord with it.​[75]​

So, when Newton (who held, of course, many unorthodox views) received letters from Bentley with the repeated suggestion that a central part of the Principia sounded like Epicureanism, he would have had every reason for concern. Bentley could be dangerous to him. The very first sentence of his initial response to Bentley’s now lost first letter reads, “When I wrote my Treatise about our system, I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men, for the belief of a Deity, and nothing can rejoice me more than to find it useful for that purpose,” (Newton to Bentley, 10 December 1692; Newton 2004: 94). Now lots of commentators have used this sentence as sincere autobiography. Nevertheless, we need not attribute to Newton duplicity, however, to recognize that the claim – however sincere and carefully crafted -- is almost entirely political in nature. It is designed to curry favor with a powerful and dangerous interlocutor. 

More important, the first sentence of Newton’s response to Bentley does very little justice to the content of the Principia.​[76]​ As I have argued, the tenor of the first edition of the Principia is largely naturalistic. It is very hard to see how it can be read as promoting “principles as might work with considering men, for the belief of a Deity.” (This is not to deny that indirectly the Principia may be conducive to such an end.) By contrast in the book, there is an alternative statement that gives an entirely adequate account of the aims of the Principia: “But in what follows, a fuller explanation will be given of how to determine true motions from their causes, effects, and apparent differences, and, conversely, of how to determine from motions, whether true or apparent, true causes and effects. For to this was the purpose for which I composed the following treatise,” (Scholium to the Definitions; Newton 1999: 413-14).​[77]​ 

Philosophically, the crucial part of Newton’s claim is that against the dominant hypothetical approach prevalent in his time, his method would be able to uncover causes in nature. But theologically, the crucial part of Newton’s statement in the Scholium to the definitions is that he is promising readers to settle the Copernican controversy once and for all; he will teach how to distinguish apparent from true motion. Of course, as we have seen the theology of even the first edition of the Principia is compatible with the commitment to the existence of a deity. Above I have called attention to the ways in which Newton argued for a Providentialist deity. But Newton’s deity is decisively anti-anthropocentric. In fact, Newton’s arguments in the Principia were traditionally viewed as belonging to an Epicurean tradition (which did not deny the existence of deities), and inimical to Christian religion. Once alerted to this reading of his book, Newton prevented it from gaining currency: first, in his adamant rejections of it to Bentley; later (through the 1690s) in private attempts to develop a reading of Epicurean tradition more in accord with the new orthodoxy of his time;​[78]​ eventually, by re-framing the second edition of the Principia in dramatic ways by letting Bentley rewrite Halley’s ode, by the addition of the General Scholium, which Voltaire called “the little treatise on metaphysics,”​[79]​ and by letting Cotes argue for Newton’s orthodoxy in the new “preface.”​[80]​

My interpretation of these matters is speculative, of course. Many will prefer to avoid such a political interpretation of these letters. But it is worth pointing out that the current historiography accepts uncritically the claim that Newton had somehow handpicked Bentley to be the first Boyle lecturer.​[81]​ But there is not a shred of evidence that Newton had anything to do with the selection of Bentley.​[82]​ It is true that Newton was present at Boyle’s funeral.​[83]​ But there is no other evidence linking Newton to the selection of Bentley as a Boyle lecturer.​[84]​ There is, in fact, no evidence that prior to his exchange with Bentley Newton had a positive view of Bentley.
 
The upshot of this is that treating the correspondence with Bentley as evidence for Newton’s views in the first edition of the Principia is fraught with difficulty not sufficiently appreciated by those who routinely appeal to the correspondence to settle interpretive debates. In particular, given that Newton’s views on gravity are singled out as “Epicurean,” Newton’s main points in the passages in the exchange with Bentley and subsequently in writings available to a wide audience that deal with gravity should be first and foremost be read as Newton distancing himself from the potential charge of blasphemy.​[85]​ 


III: Understanding Kant’s response to Newton.

In this section, I argue first that UNH as a whole responds to a number of specific arguments by Newton in the General Scholium. I provide considerable textual evidence that Kant was aware of this. Second, I show that Kant’s argument flirts with Spinozistic themes.

IIIA: Kant and Newton’s General Scholium

In conclusion, I offer a new interpretation of the relationship between the General Scholium and Kant’s UNH.​[86]​ It is well known that the “General Scholium” offers arguments for the existence and the nature of our knowledge of God. Newton first argues that while the orbits of celestial bodies are law-governed, such laws nor the “mechanical causes” of his philosophic opponents can be the cause of the orbits themselves. Newton barely gives an argument for his claim that the laws of motion cannot be the cause of the orbits. He does claim that it is “inconceivable” that the laws of nature could account for such “regular” orbits. (Newton 1999: 940) But in what follows Newton packs quite a bit into this claim.​[87]​ In particular, it turns out that for Newton the regularity consists not merely in their being law-governed, but also that the trajectories and mutual attractions of the planets and comets hinder each other least. This culminates in Newton’s conclusion that “This most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets, and Comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being.” (Newton 1999: 940) Without further argument Newton rules out the possibility that these particular three features (that is, (i) law-governed orbits that (ii) hinder each other minimally and that (iii) are jointly beautiful) could be caused by other causes than God. Newton then offers the “immense distances” among the planetary systems, which thus avoid the possibility of gravity induced mutual collapse, as another, empirical phenomena that supports his argument from inconceivability. (Newton 1999: 940) Moreover, given that Newton could put no constraint on the mass of comets, he must have found it striking that these do not disrupt the motions of the solar system through which they pass.​[88]​

Newton’s position rules out two contrasting, alternative approaches, both discussed later in the General Scholium: i) that God is constantly arranging things in nature. As he writes, “In him are all things contained and moved; yet neither affects the other.” (Newton 1999: 941)​[89]​ No further argument is offered against an hyper-active God. ii) That everything is the product of “blind metaphysical necessity.” (Newton 1999: 942) This second view is associated with the neo-Epicurean system of Spinoza (and Hobbes). Newton offers an independent argument against that approach, namely that given that necessity is uniform it cannot account for observed variety. Now, it is only a limited objection against Spinozism; for it is committed to there being sufficient reason for infinite variety in the modes (E1p16 & E1p28).​[90]​ At best Newton has shifted the burden of proof.​[91]​ Because Newton has the better physics, he can claim to have constrained any possible explanation that will account for the observed variety. But it is not insurmountable: all a necessitarian needs to show is how the laws and the “regular” orbits are possible given some prior situation.

Moreover, in the absence of a discussion of initial conditions of the universe Newton’s claim begs the question. One can understand Kant’s UNH as taking up the challenge of accounting for the universe in light of Newton’s laws of motion. In particular, in part 2, section 8 of UNH is Kant’s refutation of Newton’s argument. That section starts with the following claim:

“We cannot look at the planetary structure without recognizing the supremely excellent order in its arrangement and the sure marks of God’s hand in the perfection of its interrelationships. After reason has considered and wondered at so much beauty and excellence, it rightly grows indignant at the daring foolishness which permits itself to ascribe all this to chance [Zufalle] and a happy contingency [Ungefähr]. There must have been a Highest Wisdom to make the design, and an Infinite Power must have produced it. Otherwise it would be impossible to encounter in the planetary structure so many purposes cooperating in a single intention.” (355;(331-332))

In what follows Kant offers two opposing options: Newton’s approach in the “General Scholium” (God as an “alien hand” that produces “restriction and coordination which permit us to see the perfection and beauty in it;” Kant also calls it the thesis that introduces “the immediate hand of God”) and his preferred proposal “the plan for the structure of the universe is already set in the fundamental composition of eternal natures by the Highest Understanding and implanted in the eternal laws of motion, so that they develop themselves freely from them in a manner appropriate to the most perfect order” He remarks ruefully: “An almost universal prejudice [Vorurtheil] has made most philosophers oppose the capability of nature to produce something ordered through its universal laws, just as if it meant that we were challenging God’s rule over the world, when we seek the primordial developments in the forces of nature, as if these forces were a principle independent of the Godhead and were an eternally blind fate.”  (UNH, Part 2, Section 8, 356 (332))

Now, this is not the place to explore all of Kant’s arguments against Newton’s position. But in light of our discussion one is worth quoting in particular: “what then will this curious method of demonstrating the certain existence of a Highest Being out of the fundamental incapacity of nature prove by way of an effectively counter to Epicurus? If the natures of things bring forth by the eternal laws of their being nothing but disorder and absurdity, then they will show in that very manner the nature of their independence from God. What sort of an idea will we be able to create for ourselves of a divinity whom the universal natural laws obey only through some sort of compulsion and in and of themselves act against the wisest designs of the Divinity? Will the enemy of providence not win just as many victories from these false basic principles, when he can point to harmonies [Übereinstimmungen] which the universally effective natural laws produce without any special limitations?” (UNH, Part 2, Section 8, 357 (332ff)) According to Kant, Newton’s argument in the General Scholium fails as an argument against Epicureanism!​[92]​ It makes the laws of nature too independent from God.​[93]​ 

Of course, this does not address the burden-shifting argument that Newton has offered. But UNH as a whole meets the burden of evidence. As Kant writes (emphasis his) “the world gives evidence of a mechanical development from the general natural laws as the origin of its arrangement and, secondly, that the manner of the mechanical development which we have presented is the true one.” (UNH, Part 2, Section 8, 359; A.149) Even if one denies that Kant has succeeded in providing a true account, his speculative, Newtonian cosmogony shows how the world could have developed such that the orbits of the planets can be explained by Newtonian laws; he certainly has met Newton’s burden-shifting argument.​[94]​

IIIB: Kant and Spinozism.

But a question remains: does Kant’s success in meeting Newton’s burden shifting argument against (neo-Epicurean) Spinozism, re-open the door to the system of blind metaphysical necessity? Now given all of Kant’s talk about providence, it might seem perverse to even pose this question.​[95]​ Yet, as we have seen, Kant’s (Newtonian) providence is resolutely anti-anthropocentric. In a single striking passage, Kant embraces several aspects of this anti-anthropocenticism that are distinctly Spinozistic.​[96]​ In particular, i) Kant endorses the “satire” of the “creatures who live in the forests of a beggar’s head” and ii) which men are compared to lice by a Fontennelle like character.​[97]​ In his own voice, Kant explicitly endorses the analogy between “humans” and “insects”​[98]​ in order iii) to combat anthropocentric idea that nature is designed for human purpose (that is, final causes aimed at humans). Moreover, Kant insists that iv) “The limitlessness of creation contains within itself, with equal necessity, all natures which its superbly fecund richness produces;” Kant v) argues that the beauty of the whole...consists in the interrelatedness;” vi) “everything is determined by universal laws which nature effects through the combination of forces originally planted in it.” Even vii) the surprisingly moralistic conclusion of the passage “has the possessor of those inhabited forests on the beggar’s head ever created greater disasters among the races of this colony than the son of Philip brought about among the race of his fellow citizens, when his wicked genius gave him the idea that the world was created only for his sake?” echoes Spinoza’s denunciations of Alexander the great (i.e., the son of Philip) in the Theological Political Treatise (see chapter 17). 

The first six of these are all recognizable Spinozistic themes, and echo a famous passage in Spinoza: his letter to Oldenburgh where he compares man to a worm in the blood.​[99]​ One may, perhaps, argue that the fifth point about beauty is un-Spinozistic. In the Appendix to Ethics 1, Spinoza famously had insisted that cosmic beauty is a subjective, imaginative projection. But here Kant’s way of understanding beauty as consisting in the interrelatedness of the universe is Spinozistic. For in the letter to Oldenburgh on the worm analogy, Spinoza had propounded a kind of Cosmic harmony of the sort that Kant explicitly calls beautiful: “All natural bodies can and ought to be considered in the same way as we have here considered the blood, for as bodies are surrounded by others, and are mutually determined to exist and operate in a fixed and definite proportion while the relations between motion and rest in the sum total of them, that is, in the whole universe, remain unchanged. Hence it follows that each body, in so far as it exists as modified in a particular manner, must be considered as a part of the whole universe, as agreeing with the whole, and associated with the remaining parts.”

Kant’s UNH is suffused with appeals to this kind of harmony. He never names Spinoza, but he recognizes such appeal is not innocent: “The defender of religion fears that the harmony [Übereinstimmungen] which can be explained by a natural tendency of matter would demonstrate the independence of nature from divine providence” (preface, 229; (223)) and shortly thereafter he calls such a system, in which nature is independent from divine providence, “Epicurean” in the second passage quoted at length in section 1A above). We have already encountered Kant’s response to this charge: it contrasts the “blind collision” of Lucretius with his own embrace of “matter bound to certain necessary laws.” 

And then follows his main argument for the existence of God that is supposed to distinguish him from the Epicureans: “There is a God for just this reason, that nature, even in a chaotic state, can develop only in an orderly and rule-governed manner,” (UNH, Preface, 235 (228),).​[100]​ Now one might think this is not Spinozistic because in the Appendix to part I of the Ethics, Spinoza criticized the very claim that there “is order in things” and denies that “there is order in nature” except in relation to our imagination (which is not a source of secure knowledge in Spinoza). The same such claim is to be found in Spinoza’s letter to Oldenburgh with the worm analogy: “I do not attribute to nature either beauty or deformity, order or confusion. Only in relation to our imagination can things be called beautiful or deformed, ordered or confused.” But all Kant is saying here is that nature is law-governed and therefore there is a God. Spinoza would not deny this. 

In context, Kant’s argument seems to be something like this: 
P1) the uniformity of matter is evidence of shared, “primordial origin”
P2) nature can develop from chaos in an orderly and rule-governed manner (as has been shown by the whole argument of UNH); 
P3) matter is not intrinsically self-organizing​[101]​ 
P4) only a “self-sufficient Highest Reason” [allgenugsamer höchster Verstand ] can be the original source of matter’s ordering and rule-governed tendency (UNH, Preface, 234 (227))
P5) that is, from chaos nature cannot develop by chance (ruling out Lucretius)
Therefore, there must be a God (if understood as self-sufficient highest reason). 

Now, Kant’s argument to design ‘advances’ over the version in Newton’s General Scholium in two respects: first, with the help of a Newtonian cosmogony and cosmology, God’s role is pushed back to the origin of matter; second, God has been cleansed of anthropomorphic qualities.​[102]​ (Of course, Kant is not the first to make these moves; hence, the scare quotes around ‘advances’.) God has been turned into a “self-sufficient highest reason.” Kant’s position rules out a voluntaristic God. It looks as if even God could not have done otherwise because from chaos nature could have developed only in one way. Thus, Kant’s God can neither perform miracles (because these would violate the one and only possible development) nor have a choice in adding different qualities to the nature of matter (because this, too, would violate the one and only possible development). This is to say, while the argument is not Spinozistic, the argument’s conclusion is. In particular, Kant ends up endorsing key Spinozistic positions (necessetarianism; uniformity of matter; no miracles, anti-anthropomorphism, etc). 
In fact, in explaining his argument for the existence of God, Kant writes, “All things connected together in a reciprocal harmony must be united among themselves in a single being on which they collectively depend. Thus, there is present a Being of all beings, an Infinite Intelligence and Self-sufficient [Also ist ein Wesen aller Wesen, ein unendlicher Verstand und selbständige Weisheit, vorhanden].” (UNH, Part 2, Section 8, 358 (334);) This does echo Spinoza’s causa sui and the infinite intellect more generally, as well as the argument of the letter to Oldenburgh, in particular. For after describing how all the parts of nature are in harmony with each other, Spinoza describes the existence of “substance being infinite in its nature” and “each part” of material nature “belongs to the nature of substance, and, without it, can neither be nor be conceived.”
Newton’s anti-Epicurean burden-shifting arguments of the “General Scholium,” leave this particular argument as a viable alternative available to Kant. Kant concludes UNH as follows, “When vanity has demanded its share of human nature, then the eternal mind [unsterbliche Geist] will, with a swift leap, raise itself up above everything finite and further develop its existence in a new relationship with the totality of nature, which arises out of closer ties with the Highest Being. From then on, this lofty nature, which in itself contains the source of blissful happiness, will no longer be scattered among external objects in order to seek out a calming effect among them. The collective essence of creatures, which has a necessary harmony with the pleasure of the Highest Original Being, must also have this harmony for its own pleasure and will light upon it only in perpetual contentment.” (UNH, Conclusion, 395 (367)) It is hard to shake the feeling that Kant is vividly describing Spinoza’s vision of the eternal mind’s contented, intellectual love of God in the act of knowing. 


Eric Schliesser, nescio2@yahoo.com (​mailto:nescio2@yahoo.com​)










^1	  I thank audiences at Bucharest, especially Dana Jalobeanu, Brussels, Utrecht, especially Paul Ziche and Ernst-Otto Onnasch, and Groningen for comments on presentations where I discussed earlier incarnations of this paper. I also thank Ted McGuire and Katherine Dunlop for terrific comments on a penultimate draft. Finally, I am very grateful to Michela Massimi for encouraging this paper, her detailed comments and, especially, for calling attention to the puzzling role of Epicurus in Kant’s Universal Natural History (hereafter UNH). She has also kindly shared her (forthcoming) “Kant’s dynamical theory of matter in 1755, and its debt to speculative Newtonian experimentalism,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, on the Newtonian-chemical sources to Kant's matter theory in UNH.The usual caveats obtain. 
^2	  To complicate matters: this thesis is compatible with a more thoroughgoing renewed and direct engagement with Epicurean ideas by Newton from the 1690s onward. For discussion, see below. 
^3	  In Leibniz’s correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz explicitly raises the specter that Newton reduces to Spinozism (2.7, p. 29). All my references to it are by letter, paragraph number and page-number to the 1717 edition, A collection of papers, which passed between the late learned Mr. Leibnitz, and Dr. Clarke, in the years 1715 and 1716: Relating to the principles of natural philosophy and religion. With an appendix. To which are added, Letters to Dr. Clarke concerning liberty and necessity; from a gentleman of the University of Cambridge: with the Doctor's answers to them. Also Remarks upon a book, entituled, A philosophical enquiry concerning human liberty (Google eBook). 
^4	  The entry on Spinoza in Diderot’s Enclyclopedia is framed by a contrast between the systems of Spinoza and Epicurus, but even it emphasizes that both reject Providence and embrace necessity. "Spinoza, Philosophy of." The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert Collaborative Translation Project. Translated by Malcolm Eden. Ann Arbor: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.762 (accessed July 1, 2011). Originally published as "Spinosa, philosophie de," Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, volume 15, pp.463–474 (Paris, 1765).
^5	   “[This] doctrine, which is as old as Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, was in the last century revived by Gassendi, and has since been adopted by Newton and the far greater part of his followers.” Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman and J. C. Bryce, vol. III of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982). Chapter: Of the External SensesAccessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/201/56025/916354 on 2011-05-01
^6	  Massimi has called my attention to the Introduction by W. Ley to Kant’s Cosmogony (1968) where he says on pp. viii and ix that “Years later—nobody knows the date—the printed books were released, probably in 1765 or 1766.” 
^7	  See, Leibniz to Clarke 2.1 (19-20); 
^8	  See for classic works on Kant and Newton, Gerd Buchdahl (1992) Kant and the Dynamics of Reason London: Blackwell and Michael Friedman (1992) Kant and the Exact Scieces Cambridge: Harvard University Press; for Adam Smith and Newton, see Eric Schliesser (2005) “Realism in the Face of Scientific Revolutions: Adam Smith on Newton’s “Proof” of Copernicanism,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 13(4) 697-732.
^9	  I have relied on and quoted extensively (with very minor modifications) from a translation by Ian Johnston available online, http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/kant/kant2e.htm, accessed 1 June, 2011, and compared it with the German version edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, to be found in Volume 1 of Theorie-Werkausgabe Immanuel Kant: Vorkritische Schriften bis 1768 (1977 [1960], Frankfurt Am Main: Suhrkamp. I refer to the latter by page and then give parenthetical references to the Akademie-edition. The translation has no page-numbers associated with it; so in addition I always refer to the page-number of in Suhrkamp edition and in footnotes or parentheses to the page numbers in the Akademie edition. 
^10	  222 
^11	  226 
^12	  In her forthcoming paper “Kant’s Dynamical Theory,” Massimi argues that Kant contrasts his material-cause approach with what he portrays as Newton’s resort to divine intervention as an alternative explanation of the origins of the universe. My argument presupposes agreement with Massimi on this issue. As the final section of this paper argues, Kant attacks Newton’s theistic account with Newtonian physical principles. In the Principia, Newton’s argument against vortices is not global: he rules out that the planets of the present solar system are carried along on vortices, but he cannot rule out that vortices played some role in the origin of the solar system. In my discussion of the exchange with Bentley I offer reasons why Newton would not have explored that option seriously. 
^13	  Strictly speaking Kant does not attribute the doctrines to Newton. It is the point of this paper to make clear that attributing them to Newton is not unreasonable. 
^14	  358 (334). I have accepted the translation of the repeated “ohngefähre” as “chance;” Kant is clearly referring to the swerve of atoms here. (In context Kant does link the swerve with chance [Zufalls].) I thank Abe Stone, David Hyder, Thomas Sturm, and Stijn van Impe for discussion.
^15	  Of course, Kant also explicitly compares his own effort to offer a mechanical, law-governed [“mechanischen Gesetzen”] account of the development of the universe with Descartes’s earlier approach; 235 (312). 
^16	  Perhaps, Kant is drawing on a Leibnizian distinction between chance and indifference; see Leibniz’s fifth response to Clarke, 70, p. 227. Perhaps, part of the complication is caused by the fact that the doctrine of necessity can be opposed to both the rejection of providence as well as Lucretian swerve. My argument does not require that Kant read the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence 
^17	  In the manner of Newton’s Opticks: “it may be also allowed that God is able to create particles of matter of several sizes and figures, and in several proportions to space, and perhaps of different densities and forces, and thereby to vary the laws of nature, and made worlds of several sorts in several parts of the universe,” (Query 31, Newton 1979: 403–4; emphasis added).
^18	  For example, Newton writes: “And lest the systems of the fixed Stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other mutually, he hath placed those Systems at immense distances from one another.”
^19	  Martin Schönfeld (2000) The Philosophy of the Young Kan:; The Precritical Project  Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 107.
^20	  This is a very controversial claim. For more on the various ways that Newton’s God is immanent in nature, see Eric Schliesser “Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement and the Baconian Origins of the Laws of Nature” Foundations of Science, forthcoming; Eric Schliesser (2011) Newtonian Substance Monism, Distant Action, and the Apriori in Newton: a Response to Hylarie Kochiras” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42(1): 160-166 
^21	  W.R. Albury (1978) “Halley’s Ode on the Principia of Newton and the Epicurean Revival in England,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 39(1):24-43 is the Locus Classicus; my debts to this paper should become clear below.
^22	  For example, it appears from Newton’s first response that in his original letter to Newton Bentley had supposed that “every particle had an innate gravity” (Newton: 2004, 94); in the second letter, Newton writes, “You sometimes speak of gravity as essential and inherent to matter. Pray do not ascribe that notion to me; for the cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know, and therefore would take more time to consider of it” (Newton: 2004, 100). 
^23	  Andrew Janiak (2007) “Newton and the Reality of Force” The Journal of the History of Philosophy 45(1): 127-147; Andre Janiak (2008) Newton as Philosopher, Cambridge: Cambridge  University Press, Michael Friedman (2011) “Newton and Kant on Absolute Space: from theology to transcendental philosophy,” Interpreting Newton: Critical Essays, ed. A. Janiak & E. Schliesser, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; John Henry (1994) "'Pray do not ascribe that notion to me': God and Newton's Gravity" The Books of Nature and Scripture: Recent Essays on Natural Philosophy, Theology and Biblical Criticism in the Netherlands of Spinoza's Time and the British Isles of Newton's Time, edited by James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht).123-47; John Henry (2011) “Gravity and De gravitatione: The Development of Newton’s Ideas on action at a Distance”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42:11-27. In Eric Schliesser “Without God: Gravity as a Relational Quality of Matter in Newton” Vanishing Bodies in Early Modern philosophy edited by Dana Jalobeanu and Peter Anstey (Routledge, 2011), 80-102,I argue that Newton embraces active matter. Cf. Schönfeld 2000, “For Newton, Matter is passive,” while Kant embraces matter as active centers of force (110-111). See Massimi forthcoming for more background information on the Newtonian-chemical sources that embrace a more active conception of matter.
^24	  Here is how Andrew Janiak and even Maxwell quote the passage: “It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact . . . That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it” (quoted from Janiak, 2007, 128; ellipses in Janiak).
^25	  See Schönfeld 2000, 86.
^26	  Schönfeld’s main guide to Newton, Richard S. Westfall’s classic (1983) biography of Newton, Never at Rest (Cambridge: CUP) is not very interested in pursuing Epicurean/Lucretian themes in Newton. The issue does arise in Schonfeld’s footnote comment on Shea’s claim that Kant erred in ascribing a force of repulsion to Newton (Schönfeld 2000, 271 n. 44); in doing so, Shea argues for Buffon and Lucretius as sources. Schönfeld rightly notes the significance of Newton’s Opticks, but one can grant that it is Kant’s proximate cause, and still recognize that Newton is drawing on Lucretian themes. It is a bit surprising that Schönfeld misses the significance of Epicurean themes in UNH, because elsewhere he notes that Kant is explicitly engaging with Fontenelle’s Entretients, which is often treated as a Cartesian text, but has many not-so-hidden Epicurean (and Spinozist) themes.  (See Christophe Martin (2003) “D'un épicurisme “discret”: Pour une lecture lucrécienne des entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes de Fontenelle : L'épicurisme des lumières,” Dix-huitième siècle  35:55-73.) Below I call attention to the significance of the Fontenelle-Kant link, but it must be explored more fully elsewhere. 
^27	  This differs from how Bentley treats Epicureanism in the published version of his (1692) Sermons preached at Boyle's lecture: remarks upon a discourse of free-thinking; there he treats Epicurean atomism, infinite space, vacuums, and downward gravity (contrasted with mutual gravity) as distinctively Epicurean (157; on 48 he also treats the swerve as distinctly Epicurean). I thank Katherine Dunlop for calling my attention to this. I have consulted Bentley’s Sermons in the 1838 edition edited by Dyce (London: Macpherson) 
^28	  See Richard S. Westfall (1983) Never at Rest, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 589.
^29	  For the equation of “blind metaphysical necessity” and “Epicureanism” see, besides (as we have seen) Kant’s UNH, also Samuel Clarke (1998) A demonstration of the being and attributes of God (edited by Ezio Vailati) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 227-228, where Lucretius and Epicurus are taken to task for their denial of final causes.  Earlier, Clarke had connected Spinoza’s view with the position that God was a “mere necessary agent,” which is said to be “intelligent.” But according to Clarke because Spinoza’s God lacks choice it is a “blind and unintelligent necessity.” (102)
^30	  Here, by Epicurean, I mean one that dispense with a Providential God. Of course, there are varieties of Christian theism that would have been attractive to Newton to emphasize in subsequent editions.
^31	  The claim is even in Westfall (1983) Never at Rest.
^32	  See George E. Smith (2004) “The Newtonian Style in Book II of the Principia” in Isaac Newton’s Natural Philosophy, edited by Jed Z. Buchwald and I. Bernard Cohen, Cambridge: MIT Press, 264ff.
^33	  See George E. Smith 
^34	  J. Bruce Brackenridge (1995) The Key to Newton’s Dynamics: The Kepler Problem and the Principia. University of California Press, Berkeley. I thank Chris Smeenk for calling my attention to this.
^35	  See I.B. Cohen’s Introduction to Newton 1999. 
^36	  See, A. Shapiro (2004) “Newton’s “Experimental Philosophy”” Early Science and Medicine, 9(3): 185-217.
^37	  See, especially, Leibniz’s letters, 2.1-2 (29-23); 5.130 (227); 5.70 (227), but there are more allusions. 
^38	  Newton had suggested to Bentley that he read the first three sections of Book I and then proceed to Book III. See Westfall, Never at Rest, 504.
^39	  Dana Jalobeanu (2007) “Space, bodies and geometry: Some sources of Newton’s metaphysics”. Zeitsprünge, Forschungen zur Frühen Neuzeit, 11:81-113.  See also J.E. McGuire (1978) “Existence, actuality and necessity: Newton on space and time” Annals of Science, 35(5): 463 – 508. Moreover, my argument here supplements my attempt to characterize Newton’s views on gravity when he wrote the first edition of the Principia and before later developments: Eric Schliesser “Without God: Gravity as a Relational Quality of Matter in Newton” Vanishing Bodies in Early Modern philosophy edited by Dana Jalobeanu and Peter Anstey (Routledge, 2011), 80-102. Eric Schliesser (2011) “Newton’s substance monism, distant action, and the nature of Newton’s empiricism: discussion of H. Kochiras “Gravity and Newton’s substance counting problem.” Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A  42(1): 160-166. SeeJaniak (this volume) for critical responses..
^40	  I. Bernard Cohen (1964) “'Quantum in Se Est': Newton's Concept of Inertia in Relation to Descartes and Lucretius,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 19(2):131-155.
^41	  See Alexandre Koyré (1957) classic treatment, From the closed world to the infinite universe, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Koyré emphasizes Platonism in Newton. For the Lucretian roots of infinite space, see Edward Grant (1981) Much ado about nothing: theories of space and vacuum from the Middle Ages to the scientific revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 183ff. Kant also embraced the Newtonian-Lucretian  claim that “infinite space teems with cosmic systems” [der unendliche Weltraum von Weltgebäuden wimmele] (UNH, Part 1, chapter 1 257 (247)). In context, Kant refers to Huygens as source of baseline knowledge. (Of course, Kant’s 
^42	  Kant also embraces the doctrine in UHN: “Moreover, the space in which they [the heavenly bodies] move is empty, the intermediate distances, which separate them from each other, are exceptionally large, and thus everything is laid out for undisturbed motion as well as for clear observation of them in as manifest a way as possible.” (Preface, 237 (229)) For discussion, see Schönfeld 2000, 80. James McGuire (1995 [1966]) “Body and Void and Newton’s DE MUNDI SYSTEMATE: Some New Sources,” reprinted in Tradition and Innovation: Newton’s Metaphysics of Nature, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 107ff, contains a nuanced discussion of Newton’s subtle shifts in the doctrine of celestial vacuum (within and outside the solar system) throughout the editions of the Principia.
^43	  In the preface to Book III, Newton argues that “spaces void of all bodies” is one of the general “topics” of the “most fundamental for philosophy,” (Newton 1999: 793). For discussion, see McGuire “Body and Void” 104.
^44	  See Roger Cotes’ “preface:” “it must be concluded that the celestial fluid has no force of inertia, since it has no force of resistance” (Newton 1999: 396).
^45	  For a nuanced treatment of Boyle and Epicureanism, see J. J. MacIntosh (1991) “Robert Boyle on Epicurean atheism and atomism”  in Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought Edited By Margaret J. Osler, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197-220. 
^46	   See Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman and J. C. Bryce, vol. III of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982). Chapter: Of the External Senses Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/201/56025/916354 on 2011-04-21.
^47	  Quoted from Z. Biener & C Smeenk (2011) in Interpreting Newton: critical essays  edited by A. Janiak & E. Schliesser, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
^48	  See McGuire “Body and Void” 105-107, and also the reference to Query 28 of the Opticks (368).
^49	  Adam Smith may have discerned it: “The hardness or softness of bodies, or the greater or smaller force with which they resist any change of shape, seems to depend altogether upon the stronger or weaker degree of cohesion with which their parts are mutually attracted to one another. The greater or smaller force with which they resist compression may, upon many occasions, be owing partly to the same cause: but it may likewise be owing to the greater or smaller proportion of empty space comprehended within their dimensions, or intermixed with the solid parts which compose them. A body which comprehended no empty space within its dimensions, which, through all its parts, was completely filled with the resisting substance, we are naturally disposed to conceive as something which would be absolutely incompressible, and which would resist, with unconquerable force, every attempt to reduce it within narrower dimensions.” Adam Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. W. P. D. Wightman and J. C. Bryce, vol. III of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982). Chapter: Of the External Senses Accessed from http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/201/56025/916353 on 2011-04-21 (same). (In the very next paragraph Smith connects Newton to the Epicurus, Lucretius, and Gassendi.) For a recent treatment of Newton’s atomism, see Alan Chalmers (2009) “Newton’s Atomism and its Fate,” The Scientist’s Atom and the Philosopher’s Stone  Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, (279): 123-138.
^50	  For the classic discussion, see James McGuire (1995 [1967])“Transmutation and Immutability: Newton’s Doctrine of Physical Qualities” reprinted in Tradition and Innovation.
^51	  Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs  (2002) The Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of Alchemy in Newton's Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23ff.
^52	  See Catherine Wilson (2008) Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity , Oxford: Oxford University Press 52–4 & p. 80.
^53	  Kant continues, “We can thus assume that there are still other planets beyond Saturn which are even more eccentric and hence even more closely akin to comets, thanks to a continual gradation which finally turns planets into comets.”  (Part 1, 268 (258)
^54	  In a footnote below I note the tacit afterlife of the third hypothesis in Newton’s additions to his theory of the role of comets in circulating the building blocks of life through the universe in the second edition of the Principia.
^55	  See the landmark paper by J. E. McGuire and P. M. Rattansi (1966) “Newton and the 'Pipes of Pan',” Notes Rec. R. Soc. Lond. December 1, 21:108-143.In his Sermons, Bentley, treats Lucretius as a “system of atheism” (375; recall that Kant treats Leucippus and Democritus as systems of atheism); Bentley recognizes that in the Ancient world, Epicurus and Democritus were suspected of introducing gods into their system to avoid political trouble, but he also believed that they were forced into accepting thee existence of gods on philosophic grounds (5-6; cf 24). Of course, in the 17th century a number of thinkers – most prominently, Gassendi – had promoted a Christianized Epicureanism—and Newton’s views are consistent with it.
^56	  For more on the significance of Gregory’s views in the 1690s, see Eric Schliesser & George E. Smith, “Huygens’ 1688 Report to the Directors of the Dutch East India Company on the Measurement of Longitude at Sea and the Evidence it offered against Universal Gravity,” forthcoming in Archive for the History of the Exact Sciences.
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^85	  This has been stressed by John Henry all along: Henry, 1999 J. Henry, Isaac Newton and the problem of action at a distance. Krisis,  30  (1999); Henry, 2007 J. Henry, Isaac Newton y el problema de la acción a distancia. Estudios de Filosofia,  35  (2007), pp. 189–226. 
^86	  I do not explore the cosmogony and cosmology of Newton’s letters to Bentley in relation to Kant’s cosmogony and cosmology.
^87	   Here is Kant’s judgment on the matter: “Celestial space, as has already been mentioned several times, is empty, or at least filled with infinitely sparse material, which, as a result, can provide no means of impressing the common motions on celestial bodies. This difficulty is so significant and valid that Newton, who had reason to trust the insights of his philosophy as much as any other mortal, saw himself compelled here to abandon the hope of resolving through natural law and material forces the transmission of the orbital forces present in the planets, in spite of all the harmony which pointed to a mechanical origin. It is a troubling decision for a philosopher to give up the effort of an investigation in the case of a compound phenomenon which is still remote from the simple basic laws and to be satisfied with the reference to the immediate hand of God. Nevertheless, Newton acknowledged here the dividing line separating nature and the finger of God from each other, the pattern of set laws of the former and the nod of the latter. After the doubt of such a great philosopher, it may appear presumptuous still to hope for some fortunate progress in a matter of such difficulty.” Of course, Kant then immediately turns the tables, “But this very difficulty which deprived Newton of the hope of understanding on the basis of natural forces the orbital forces allotted to the heavenly bodies, whose direction and arrangements make up the system of the planetary structure, was the origin of the theory which we have presented in the previous sections.” (UNH Part 2, section 8; 363-364 (338-339)) 
^88	  Chris Smeenk called my attention to this feature. My work on the General Scholium (and Newton more generally) has benefitted from our joint research for C. Smeenk & E. Schliesser (forthcoming) “Newton’s Principia” Oxford Handbook for History of Physics, Ed. By J. Buchwald, Oxford: OUP.
^89	  As Ted McGuire pointed out, this passage may be thought problematic for my claim that Newton’s God is immanent in nature. But the sentence is compatible with the denial that God stands outside nature (e.g., God “will not be never or nowhere,” (Newton 1999: 941).  
^90	  I am citing Spinoza’s Ethics in the standard notation of Part and proposition.
^91	  Samuel Clarke (while drawing on More’s Confutatio), has a more promising line of attack; he criticizes Spinoza’s treatment of the origin and conceptualization of motion: Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, VIII, 45. 
^92	  So, while it is by no means settled that the General Scholium is directed against Epicurean worldview, my paper makes clear how Kant would have seen the dialectic. 
^93	  Kant agrees with Hume’s assessment: “It was never the meaning of Sir ISAAC NEWTON to rob second causes of all force or energy; though some of his followers have endeavoured to establish that theory upon his authority” (footnote at end of 7.1.25, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; a note on terminology: God is a first cause; laws or forces are secondary causes that act within nature). For a separate argument that in the “General Scholium,” Newton is embracing laws as so-called second causes, see Hylarie Kochiras (2009) "Gravity and Newton’s Substance Counting Problem” Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A Volume 40, Issue 3, September, Pages 267-280 and  Eric Schliesser (2011) “Newton’s substance monism, distant action, and the nature of Newton’s empiricism: discussion of H. Kochiras “Gravity and Newton’s substance counting problem.” Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A  42(1): 160-166. 
^94	  This is not the place to explore how unwelcome this result would have been to Newton. But see the previous footnote. Leaving aside the question about Kant’s use of a vortex as a stage in cosmic development, in this paper I have taken for granted that Kant’s physical principles are properly Newtonian. 
^95	  Given the prevalent providential language in UNH, it is no surprise that most scholars have linked Kant’s UNH to Leibniz’s metaphysics; this is even true of the very interesting piece by S. Schaffer (1978) “The Phoenix of Nature: Fire and Evolutionary Cosmology in Wright and Kant” Journal for the History of Astronomy, Vol. 9, p. 191. The significance of Spinoza on the young Kant seems largely unchartered territory, but see Omri Boehm (2009) “Kant’s Critique of Spinoza,” PhD dissertation defended at Yale University.
^96	  Here’s the whole passage: “One can only approve of the satirical portrayal by that witty person from the Hague who, after quoting the general news from the scientific world, could humorously present the imaginary picture of the necessary habitation of all planets. “Those creatures who live in the forests of a beggar’s head,” he says, “had for a long time thought of their dwelling place as an immeasurably large ball and themselves as the masterworks of creation. Then one of them, whom Heaven had endowed with a more refined soul, a small Fontenelle of his species, unexpectedly learned about a nobleman’s head. Immediately he called all the witty creatures of his district together and told them with delight: ‘We are not the only living beings in all nature. Look here at this new land. More lice live here.’” If the final part of this conclusion provokes laughter, that happens not because it is far removed from the way human beings judge things, but because that very same mistake, which among human beings has basically a similar cause, seems more excusable in our case. Let us judge in an unprejudiced manner. This insect, which in its way of living as well as in its lack of worth expresses very well the condition of most human beings, can be used for such a comparison with good results. Since, according to the louse’s imagination, nature is endlessly well suited to its existence, it considers irrelevant all the rest of creation which does not have a precise goal related to its species as the central point of nature’s purposes. The human being, who similarly stands infinitely far from the highest stages of being, is sufficiently bold to flatter himself with the same imaginative picture of his existence as essential. The limitlessness of creation contains within itself, with equal necessity, all natures which its superbly fecund richness produces. From the most refined classes of thinking beings right down to the most despicable insect, no link is irrelevant to nature. And not a single one can fail to appear without in the process fracturing the beauty of the whole, which consists in the interrelatedness [Zusammenhange]. Meanwhile, everything is determined by universal laws which nature effects through the combination of forces originally planted in it. Because nature’s process produces only what is appropriate and ordered, no particular purpose is permitted to disturb and break her results. In its initial development a planet’s creation was only an infinitely small consequence of nature’s fertility, and it would now be somewhat absurd that nature’s well-grounded laws should defer to the specific purposes of this atom. If the composition of a celestial body establishes natural barriers against its becoming inhabited, then it will not have inhabitants, even though in and of itself the planet would be more beautiful if it had its own population. The excellence of creation loses nothing in such a case, for among all large quantities the infinite is the one which is not diminished by the subtraction of a finite part. It would be as if one wished to complain that the space between Jupiter and Mars is unnecessarily empty and that there are comets which are not populated. In fact, however, that insect may appear as unworthy to us as we wish, but to nature it is certainly more appropriate to maintaining its entire class than a small number of more excellent creatures, of which there would nevertheless be infinitely many, even if one region or locale should lack them. Because nature is endlessly fertile in producing both species, in their preservation and their destruction we really see both equally abandoned disinterestedly to the universal laws. Indeed, has the possessor of those inhabited forests on the beggar’s head ever created greater disasters among the races of this colony than the son of Philip brought about among the race of his fellow citizens, when his wicked genius gave him the idea that the world was created only for his sake?” (UNH, Part 3, Appendix, 379—381; (353-354)) 
^97	  Fontenelle is not an innocent reference. Recall footnote 27 above.
^98	  Schönfeld 2000. 101ff 
^99	  “Let us imagine, with your permission, a little worm, living in the blood, able to distinguish by sight the particles of blood, lymph, etc., and to reflect on the manner in which each particle, on meeting with another particle, either is repulsed, or communicates a portion of its own motion. This little worm would live in the blood, in the same way, as we live in a part of the universe, and would consider each particle of blood, not as a part, but as a whole. He would be unable to determine, how all the parts are modified by the general nature of blood, and are compelled by it to adapt themselves, so as to stand in a fixed relation to one another. For, if we imagine that there are no causes external to the blood, which could communicate fresh movements to it, nor any space beyond the blood, nor any bodies whereto the particles of blood could communicate their motion, it is certain that the blood would always remain in the same state, and its particles would undergo no modifications, save those which may be conceived as arising from the relations of motion existing between the lymph, the chyle, etc. The blood would then always have to be considered as a whole, not as a part. But, as there exist, as a matter of fact, very many causes which modify, in a given manner, the nature of the blood, and are, in turn, modified thereby, it follows that other motions and other relations arise in the blood, springing not from the mutual relations of its parts only, but from the mutual relations between the blood as a whole and external causes. Thus the blood comes to be regarded as a part, not as a whole. So much for the whole and the part. All natural bodies can and ought to be considered in the same way as we have here considered the blood, for all bodies are surrounded by others, and are mutually determined to exist and operate in a fixed and definite proportion while the relations between motion and rest in the sum total of them, that is, in the whole universe, remain unchanged. Hence it follows that each body, in so far as it exists as modified in a particular manner, must be considered as a part of the whole universe, as agreeing with the whole, and associated with the remaining parts. As the nature of the universe is not limited, like the nature of blood, but is absolutely infinite, its parts are by this nature of infinite power infinitely modified, and compelled to undergo infinite variations.” (Letter 15(32) Spinoza to Oldenburg)
^100	  Kant’s does console his readers with the claim that knowledge of the heavens is relatively easy to come by, but that we will remain ignorant of biology for foreseeable future. See Schönfeld 2000, 97
^101	  Of course, this is compatible with the fact matter encountered in nature is self-organizing. 
^102	  Abe Stone and Aaron Koller have both urged me to see a Platonic provenance originating in the Timaeus in this.
